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INTRODUCTION

The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) only allows drugs in the
marketplace after pharmaceutical companies prove that they are both
“safe” and “effective.”1 Once the FDA approves a drug, doctors can
legally prescribe the drug in any manner they choose. The FDA does not
regulate the practice of medicine, and “physicians are free to prescribe
‘any legally marketed device’ for uses other than those approved by the
FDA.”2 Physicians have this freedom under the premise that it allows
them “to provide the best-available treatments when the FDA approval
process does not keep pace with medical advancements or when rare
diseases do not affect enough patients to economically justify
manufacturers’ seeking FDA approval for new uses to treat these
diseases.”3 In fact, doctors often prescribe drugs for medical indications
other than the FDA tested and approved uses in a practice known as “offlabel” drug use.4
To maximize profits, major pharmaceutical companies (“pharma”)
primarily rely on two disparate business practices innovation and
marketing.5 Obviously, discovering additional uses for pre-existing
drugs can result in an expanded market and increased profits for these
products. However, it is illegal for pharma to actively market these “offlabel” uses without securing FDA approval for these additional
indications. Pharma, however, can conduct research outside of the FDA
regulatory process to discover additional uses for a specific drug. In
turn, these studies on alternative uses might persuade doctors to prescribe
the drug in an off-label manner, but only if doctors become aware that
such off-label uses are medically indicated.6 How this off-label usage
information reaches doctors is a contentious legal point.7 There is a fine
line “between drug companies providing information about possible offlabel uses and drug companies promoting use in a manner not sanctioned
by the [FDA].”8

1. 21 C.F.R. § 310.301 (2006); see George S. Craft, Jr., Promoting Off-Label in
Pursuit of Profit: An Examination of a Fraudulent Business Model, 8 HOUS. J. HEALTH L.
& POL’Y 103, 104 (2007).
2. Craft, supra note 1, at 105 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 396 (2006 & Supp. 2010)).
3. Id.
4. See Anique Gonzalez, Drug Companies and “Off-Label” Marketing, GEN.
COUNSEL CONSULTING, http://bit.ly/RgGaLK (last visited Oct. 22, 2012).
5. Craft, supra note 1, at 104. In this article, when the authors use the term
“pharma,” they are referring to multi-national pharmaceutical companies that principally
rely on patented drugs, as opposed to generic drugs, for their profits.
6. See Craft, supra note 1, at 108-09.
7. See id. at 105-06.
8. Gonzalez, supra note 4.
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Belying pharma’s claims that drugs cost so much because of
research and development (R&D) expenses, over the past decade, drug
manufacturers have spent approximately twice as much on marketing
existing drugs than on R&D for new drugs.9 In 2002, before the
Department of Justice (DOJ) began actively investigating the prevalence
of off-label marketing,10 the ten largest pharmaceutical companies spent
31 percent of their revenues on marketing.11 Comparatively, these same
ten companies spent only 14 percent on R&D.12 Given these statistics, it
comes as no surprise that a 2001 study revealed that doctors prescribed
drugs in an off-label manner 21 percent of the time.13 However, the truly
alarming fact associated with this finding is that 73 percent of these offlabel drug usages had little or no scientific support.14 In other words, the
vast majority of off-label prescriptions imposed unnecessary medical
risks on patients and unnecessary financial costs on payors (i.e., patients,
private insurers, self-insured employers, Medicare, and Medicaid).
A major reason for the high prevalence of off-label usage is the
rigorous clinical testing imposed by the FDA for a new drug application
(NDA). In its role as “market gatekeeper,” the FDA will reject an NDA
if: (1) the accompanying submitted reports “do not include adequate tests
by all methods reasonably applicable to show whether or not such drug is
safe for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended or suggested
in the proposed labeling thereof”;15 (2) “the results of such tests show
that such drug is unsafe for use under such conditions or do not show that
such drug is safe for use under such conditions”;16 or (3) ”there is a lack
of substantial evidence that the drug will have the effect it purports or is
represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed,
recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling thereof.”17 In other
words, the FDA will not accept a NDA unless there is substantial
evidence that regulators could fairly and responsibly conclude that the

9. Craft, supra note 1, at 104.
10. In the latter part of the decade, pharmaceutical giants Pfizer and Eli Lilly & Co.
settled civil and criminal lawsuits in excess of $1.4 billion each, and smaller companies
settled suits for hundreds of millions of dollars. See Melly Alazraki, Pfizer Pays a
Record $2.3 Billion to Settle Criminal Charges, DAILYFINANCE.COM (Sept. 2, 2009,
3:00 PM), http://aol.it/4WMzB.
11. Craft, supra note 1, at 104.
12. Id. at 104-05.
13. David C. Radley et al., Off-Label Prescribing Among Office-Based Physicians,
166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021, 1023 (2006), available at http://bit.ly/RR413E.
14. Id.
15. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2006 & Supp. 2011).
16. Id.
17. Id.
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drug will have the effect it purports to have under the conditions of use
prescribed or recommended in its proposed labeling.18
Given the costly and time-consuming process for obtaining FDA
approval for off-label uses, coupled with the flexibility in the practice of
“medical arts,” pharma has limited incentive to submit market-approved
products for additional FDA testing. In fact, if an approved drug has a
large off-label market, there is a significant financial risk for drug
manufacturers in seeking FDA validation for these uses. If the clinical
trials reveal negative safety or efficacy data, the already established offlabel market for the drug would cease to exist. Consequently, there is a
substantial gap in reliable scientific data supporting the safety and
efficacy of drugs used in an off-label manner.19
As a result of the decreased safety and efficacy in off-label
prescribing, the FDA, DOJ, and the Office of Inspector General of the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (OIG) have pursued
stringent investigations of pharma.20 These three bodies have prosecuted
manufacturers guilty of illegal off-label promotion as violations of the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA) and the federal False
Claims Act (FCA).21 Investigations in the past five years have led to
payouts by Pfizer and Eli Lilly, two titans in the industry, of $2.3 billion
and $1.42 billion, respectively.22 Moreover, since 2004, “Pfizer, Eli
Lilly & Co., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., and four other drug companies
have paid a total of $7 billion in fines and penalties.”23 However, at the
same time, from 2001 to 2008, Pfizer made $16.8 billion in revenue from
selling the medicines it was fined for, and Eli Lilly made $36 billion in
revenue from off-label prescribing of a single drug between 2000 and
2008.24 Emphasizing not just the profitability but prevalence of off-label
sales, in 2002, Pfizer earned $2.27 billion from sales of a drug Neurontin,
of which $2.12 billion (approximately 94 percent of overall sales for the
drug) came from off-label use.25 While these fines may seem staggering
in isolation, their deterrent effect pales in comparison with the huge
financial profits stemming from off-label marketing. As an amoral
18. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. &
ETHICS 717, 730-31 (2005).
19. Id. at 731.
20. Craft, supra note 1, at 105.
21. See id. at 107-08, 112-15; see also John E. Osborn, Can I Tell You the Truth? A
Comparative Perspective on Regulating Off-Label Scientific and Medical Information, 10
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 299, 308-14 (2010).
22. Alazraki, supra note 10.
23. David Evans, Pfizer Broke the Law by Promoting Drugs for Unapproved Uses,
Bloomberg (Nov. 9, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://bloom.bg/1y6tDl.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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economic actor, pharma could conclude that such fines are a “cost of
doing business” and not substantially change their illegal business
practices.26
This article will discuss the current state of off-label medicine,
relevant legislation in the area, and a proposal designed to capture the
benefits of off-label medicine while limiting its dangers when practiced
perniciously. Part II will discuss the regulations in place governing offlabel promotion and will detail the practice of ghostwriting and its
associated concerns. Part III will analyze the costs and benefits of offlabel marketing and practice of medicine, and will utilize a case study to
demonstrate the predicament of drug manufacturers. Part IV will set
forth a proposal to use the newly created Patient-Centered Outcomes
Research Institute to generate unbiased research on off-label uses, which,
in turn, would create a safe harbor for drug companies to widely
disseminate studies generated through this process to the medical
community. Finally, Part V will present concluding thoughts on the
overarching policy considerations driving the need for legislative reform.
II.

OFF-LABEL MARKETING: A TALE OF REGULATORY FAILURE

The FDA serves as the gatekeeper when it comes to ensuring that
drug manufacturers abide by federal regulations and properly submit
their drugs for testing. Although the FDA does not have the authority to
prevent medical practitioners from prescribing previously approved
drugs for off-label purposes, it has statutory authority over pharma’s
marketing of such drugs and uses this authority to prevent manufacturers
from engaging in illegal off-label promotion.27
The FDA draws its statutory authority to regulate the sale and
marketing of drugs in the U.S. via the FDCA.28 The FDCA bestows
substantial authority upon the FDA to determine the safety and efficacy
of all “new” (including approved drugs that are being marketed for an
unapproved use) drugs prior to marketing and to regulate a new drug’s
proposed labeling to ensure that it is not false or misleading.29
“Labeling” is a term of art that encompasses more than simply the
external label on a bottle; it is defined under the FDCA to include all
tangible material that accompanies a drug.30 Specifically, labeling

26. Id.
27. Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 733.
28. Osborn, supra note 21, at 308 (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-99 (2006)).
29. Id.
30. Id.; see also Richard C. Ascroft, The Impact of the Washington Legal
Foundation Cases on Pharmaceutical Manufacturer Practices in the United States, 34
IND. L. REV. 95, 100 (2000).
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“includes the product’s package insert and promotional materials,
including the detailing brochures used by the manufacturer to promote
sales of the product”;31 thus, this broad language allows the FDA to
control the marketing and promotion of new drugs.
Investigations surrounding off-label promotion have relied on two
theories under the FDCA. The first theory contends that off-label
promotion constitutes misbranding, meaning that the product contains
inadequate directions for the unapproved use or that the manufacturer has
supplied “false or misleading” information concerning the product.32
The second theory rests on a separate conception of misbranding,
maintaining that “it constitutes the introduction of an unapproved new
drug into interstate commerce.”33
A.

Legal Implications of FDA’s Broad Definition of “Labeling”

Regarding the first theory pertaining to false or misleading
information, the FDCA specifies that the drug’s labeling may not suggest
that it be used for any new condition that has not been approved by the
FDA. The FDA’s expansive reading of the term “labeling” includes
nearly any item or information a drugmaker presents regarding a product,
even materials that do not accompany the drug, such as promotions and
advertisements.34 Thus, the FDCA’s “prohibition of false or misleading
labeling is transformed by the [FDA] into an effective prohibition on any
advertisement, promotional message, or discussion that is not ‘consistent
with’ the approved product labeling . . . regardless of whether it is
truthful or accurately reflects good medical practice.”35
Advocates of liberal off-label usage argue that, to the extent the rule
prohibits dissemination of information that is medically valid, it is
illogical and harmful to the public interest.36 Their contention is that the
primary rationale for off-label medicine is to allow new treatments to be
used therapeutically well before the exhaustive FDA approval process
would allow. Therefore, by imposing this particular limitation, the FDA
is frustrating the potential benefits of off-label medicine.
However, this deregulatory position ignores the risks of relaxing
current limitations on off-label marketing and credulously accepts the
31. Ascroft, supra note 30, at 100.
32. Craft, supra note 1, at 107 (quoting Jack Cinquegrana & Diana K. Lloyd,
Shifting Perspective on Off-Label Promotion, PHARMEXEC.COM (Jan. 1, 2006),
http://bit.ly/QNxcUg).
33. Id. at 108.
34. Osborn, supra note 21, at 308 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2012)).
35. Id. at 308-09.
36. See infra Part III (discussing the commonly identified benefits of off-label
medicine).
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“truthful” nature of studies funded by pharma. As discussed below,
pharma has become quite adept at manipulating the information
marketplace. One tactic instituted by pharma is the inclusion of
contractual gag clauses to prevent clinical investigators from publishing
unfavorable results that would negatively affect the financial interests of
the pharmaceutical company.37 Merck used this tactic to suppress
negative safety data on Vioxx, a blockbuster anti-inflammatory drug that
it later pulled from the market because of increased risks of heart attack
and strokes associated with long-term use of this product.38 Another
troubling strategy used is “ghostwriting,” where professional writers are
paid to create scientific publications and, in turn, researchers or doctors
with impressive credentials are paid to attach their name and legitimacy
to such articles.39 Without checking these abuses, there will remain a
valid suspicion that dissemination of “truthful” off-label findings can
harm patients and the practice of medicine.
B.

Liability for Introducing Products into Interstate Commerce

The second theory under the FDCA providing for the FDA’s
regulatory powers is that the FDCA also makes it a crime to introduce an
unapproved new drug into interstate commerce.40 As previously
mentioned, it is sometimes irrelevant that the drug has already received
approval for marketing and distribution by the FDA because a drug is
considered “new” when it is promoted for uses that have not been FDA
approved.41
The term “new” takes on an extended meaning—limiting the range
of marketing and promotional activities of drug manufacturers—as a
result of the FDA’s differentiation between “intended” and “unintended”
uses. “A manufacturer’s intended use includes all uses objectively
intended by the drug manufacturer based upon statements made in
labeling, in advertisements, or in written or oral statements by company
representatives, and if the FDA-approved labeling does not cover each
‘intended use’ then a drug [] is deemed misbranded.”42 Thus, although
FDAMA allows drug manufacturers to distribute information on offlabel uses within strict limitations, the FDCA effectively counters this

37. See Robert Steinbrook, Gag Clauses in Clinical-Trial Agreements, 352 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 2160, 2160 (2005) (“Sponsors with a financial interest in the outcome of
clinical research can suppress negative results.”).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Craft, supra note 1, at 108.
41. Id.
42. Osborn, supra note 21, at 309.
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permission by requiring that each so-called intended use be FDAapproved; otherwise, the company has violated the law by introducing a
“misbranded” product into interstate commerce.
C.

Liability under the False Claims Act

In addition to liability under the FDCA, a pharmaceutical company
may also find itself in violation of the federal False Claims Act (FCA).
The FCA makes it unlawful to “knowingly present[], or cause[] to be
presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval” by the
government.43 The pharmaceutical industry contends that the application
of the FCA to off-label promotion is convoluted because it requires
several links to ultimately find the drug manufacturers liable. This is a
fair claim given the chain of liability: (1) drug companies publish and
disseminate off-label information through peer-reviewed articles,
medical journals, and other qualified reference publications that alert
medical practitioners and pharmacists of the new, alternative uses of the
already FDA-approved drugs; (2) the drug companies then sell the
products to wholesale distributors; (3) the wholesale distributors in turn
sell to pharmacies and other providers; and (4) these other providers in
turn file claims with the government (e.g., Medicare and Medicaid).44
The essence of this legal charge is that pharma promotional activities
cause false claims to be submitted to the government for medically
unnecessary off-label uses.45 The theory of liability is somewhat strained
because it is not the drug manufacturer’s direct actions that subject it to
liability. Rather, the manufacturers’ liability is contributory because
pharmacies and providers file claims with the government, which
ultimately makes the manufacturers’ off-label promotion illegal under
the FCA.
D.

The Qui Tam Suit and its Effect on FCA Liability

Another cornerstone of the FCA is the availability of a qui tam suit,
or whistleblower provisions, which allows individuals who are aware of

43. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 (2006).
44. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (a)(1)(A) (2006).
45. Craft, supra note 1, at 113 (“These claims are based on the theory that
manufacturers promote off-label uses of drugs, knowing that physicians will prescribe
such uses to Medicaid patients and that these patients will seek reimbursement for these
off-label prescriptions from Medicaid [and Medicare].”); see also Gonzalez, supra note 4
(explaining how insurance companies, which ordinarily will only cover “medically
necessary” prescriptions and not “experimental” medications, are now contesting the offlabel prescriptions that they were forced to cover and alleging that they lost billions of
dollars as a result).
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fraud against the government to file suit on the government’s behalf and
receive a portion of the recovered funds.46 “Whistleblowers can file suit
under the FCA for fraud resulting from off-label promotion due to [the]
negative effects it has on state and federally funded programs such as
Medicaid, which may prohibit reimbursement for off-label
prescriptions.”47 To entice employees to blow the whistle on their
employer’s former or current wrongdoing, those coming forth with
information stand to collect as much as 30 percent of any settlement the
company makes with the government.48
The pertinent time in determining liability under the FCA is the date
in which the off-label speech occurs.49 As with liability under the
FDCA, the truth or medical accuracy of the information asserted and
promoted is irrelevant under the FCA.
Moreover, even if a
pharmaceutical company intends to seek FDA approval for the drug’s
use, and the use later becomes FDA approved, the relevant inquiry
focuses only on whether the information was ever marketed off-label.50
In addition to this fairness critique, from a utilitarian perspective, drug
manufacturers can argue that current FDCA and FCA limitations on offlabel promotion are too restrictive and inhibit unhealthy patients from
receiving beneficial, potentially life-saving medicines solely because
they have not passed the lengthy and arguably inefficient FDA approval
process.
A separate fairness argument for drug manufacturers is that
whistleblowers are over-incentivized. Whistleblowers, as mentioned,
play an integral part in federal regulation and enforcement under the
FCA. However, by allowing them to recover up to 30 percent of fines
incurred by the pharmaceutical companies, it is plausible that some
people in a position to blow the whistle might attempt to game the
system. For example, David Franklin, a former employee of ParkeDavis (later purchased by Pfizer), acted as a whistleblower when he sued
on behalf of taxpayers to recover money the government paid for drugs
illegally promoted off-label.51 The problematic aspect of this narrative is

46. Craft, supra note 1, at 113.
47. Id. at 113; see also Evans, supra note 23 (shedding light on how a former Pfizer
employee was instrumental in bringing the illegality of the company’s off-label
promotion to the government’s attention and mentioning how the employee collected
$24.6 million under the FCA for blowing the whistle on his former employer).
48. Evans, supra note 23.
49. Osborn, supra note 21, at 310.
50. Id.; see also United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d 39,
51-52 (D. Mass. 2001) (ruling that, in general, a violation of the FDCA for off-label
promotion is sufficient to establish liability under the FCA, regardless of whether the
underlying promotional statements were false or medically inaccurate).
51. Evans, supra note 23.
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that Franklin holds a Ph.D. in microbiology from the University of
Rhode Island, and, before taking a job with Parke-Davis, he was a
pediatric researcher at Harvard University’s Dana-Farber Cancer
Institute.52 Franklin is also married to a lawyer.53 Given his background
in science and medicine, and his spouse’s legal acumen, one can question
why he agreed to perform tasks that a priori he should have reasonably
known were illegal. Thus, it is quite plausible that similarly situated and
informed corporate insiders are motivated to further illegal promotion
schemes, rather than resist them, given the potential to recover millions
of dollars—even if they are essentially blowing the whistle on their own
actions.
E.

Liability under the FCA Pursuant to the Anti-Kickback Statute

One additional theory of liability under the FCA involves claims
made pursuant to the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS), which “prohibits
payments in any form, direct or indirect, made purposefully to induce or
reward the referral or generation of federal health care business.”54 No
private right of action exists under the AKS, which is why the FCA has
served as the necessary vehicle for whistleblowers to bring fraud claims
for AKS violations.55 Allowing whistleblower actions via the FCA for
violations of the AKS is an integral part of federal regulation because it
helps reduce two violations at once: (1) it helps cut down on the
propensity of inducements and rewards being paid to doctors for referrals
involving federal health care business, while (2) alerting the proper
authorities of illegal off-label promotions.
F.

The Washington Legal Foundation Cases and FDAMA

Although several mechanisms exist for the FDA to regulate offlabel promotion and marketing, their power to do so was constitutionally
limited by the Washington Legal Foundation (WLF) cases in the 1990s.56
The WLF challenged the FDA’s restrictions on distribution of off-label
information by manufacturers on First Amendment freedom of speech
grounds.57 The WLF decisions allow manufacturers to disseminate
scientific publications concerning the off-label use of their products to

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Craft, supra note 1, at 113; see also Stephanie Greene, False Claims Act
Liability for Off-Label Promotion of Pharmaceutical Products, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 41,
56 (2005) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2000)).
55. Greene, supra note 54, at 56-57.
56. Osborn, supra note 21, at 311.
57. Ascroft, supra note 30, at 103.
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physicians or other medical professionals, regardless of whether such
articles include a significant or exclusive focus on uses of drugs or
medical devices other than those approved by the FDA.58 Moreover,
manufacturers can have open involvement with continuing medical
education (CME) seminars that discuss off-label uses by providing
financial support and by suggesting the content or the speakers for the
event.59
In response to the WLF cases, Congress passed the Food and Drug
Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA) in 1997. Before the
passage of the FDAMA, the FDA strongly opposed the dissemination of
off-label information of any kind by a drug manufacturer.60 Section 401
of FDAMA included the first provision to allow pharmaceutical
companies to disseminate off-label information under certain
circumstances.61
FDAMA allowed drug companies to disseminate off-label
information only to health care practitioners, pharmacy benefit managers,
health insurance issuers, group health plans, and governmental
agencies.62 Manufacturers were only allowed to circulate authorized
information contained in either unabridged peer-review journals or
certain qualified reference publications.63 If manufacturers decided to
disseminate off-label information, they were required to prominently
affix alongside the information a disclaimer alerting readers that, if
applicable, other drugs were approved for this use and that the
information contains a drug or device that is not FDA approved.64
Notably, pharmaceutical companies could only disseminate such
information if they were actively seeking approval by the FDA for the
new use by means of a supplemental new drug application (sNDA) or if
such approval would be cost-prohibitive or unethical.65 Thus, while
FDAMA opened the door slightly to drug manufacturers, it placed
58. See id. at 104-05; see also Green, supra note 54, at 52.
59. Green, supra note 54, at 52-53.
60. Ascroft, supra note 30, at 101.
61. Id. at 102.
62. Id.; see also Food and Drug Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115,
111 Stat. 2296 (1997) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 42
U.S.C.).
63. Ascroft, supra note 30, at 102.
64. Id.
65. Id.; see also Tim Mackey & Bryan A. Liang, Off-Label Promotion Reform: A
Legislative Proposal Addressing Vulnerable Patient Drug Access and Limiting
Inappropriate Pharmaceutical Marketing, 45 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 1, 8 (2011)
(discussing how the court upheld FDAMA’s sNDA requirement in the second WLF case,
quantifying it as a safe harbor provision that did not prohibit protected speech or certain
conduct “but merely ensured manufacturers that enforcement action[s] would not be
taken if they conformed [with] certain requirements”).
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significant limitations on the exchange of off-label information and
allowed the FDA substantial room to regulate and investigate possible
violations.
FDAMA attempted to provide clarity in FDA regulation and
enforcement of off-label marketing. The regulatory waters were
muddied, however, by the WLF cases, and this ambiguity was
exacerbated by FDAMA’s expiration on September 30, 2006.66 The
current state of flux provides even more reason for simplified,
enforceable legislation in this arena.
G.

Ghostwriting: A Form of False-Advertising?

The WLF decisions effectively permit some marketing of drugs for
unapproved uses without the risk and expense of the trials required for
FDA approval.67 Drug companies subsequently took advantage of this
opening by practicing the scientifically and ethically troubling practice of
“ghostwriting.”68 Ghostwriting is the process by which a pharmaceutical
company contracts with or hires a medical education and
communications company (MECC) to draft articles about new uses for
FDA-approved drugs or medical devices.69 The company itself or the
MECC it contracts with will then work with prominent physicians and
scientists and pay the academic to sign his or her name as the author to
increase the likelihood that the article will be published in important
medical journals.70 Thus, when the article appears in the press, the
doctor appears as the author, while the contributions of the ghostwriter
and the pharmaceutical company remain hidden.71
Medical literature on off-label medicine can have benefits because it
makes physicians, especially in rural areas, aware of contemporary
medical techniques and newfound uses for previously approved drugs.
However, these benefits only occur if the information is accurate. The
concern about ghostwriting “is that doctors might change their
prescribing habits after reading certain articles, unaware they were
commissioned by a drug company.”72 Ghostwritten articles always

66. Mackey & Liang, supra note 65, at 8.
67. Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 733-34.
68. Id.
69. See generally Natasha Singer, Medical Papers by Ghostwriters Pushed Therapy,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2009, at A1.
70. See id.; see also STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., 111TH CONG., GHOSTWRITING IN
MEDICAL LITERATURE (2010), available at http://1.usa.gov/XagUKU (written by Sen.
Charles E. Grassley).
71. Barton Moffatt & Carl Elliott, Ghost Marketing: Pharmaceutical Companies and
Ghostwritten Journal Articles, 50 PERSP. IN BIOLOGY & MED. 18, 19 (2007).
72. Singer, supra note 69.
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contain undisclosed conflicts of interests, making it impossible for a
doctor to know whether an article is legitimate.73 Given their financial
incentives, it is not surprising that “a ghostwriter of original research will
package the message of the research paper so that it fits into the
marketing plan for the drug.”74 Thus, surreptitiously affixing the names
of well-regarded scientists and doctors to these articles enhances the
legitimacy of these articles’ favorable conclusions.75
Exemplifying the potential harm caused by ghostwriting is Wyeth’s
(a pharmaceutical company later acquired by Pfizer) push for two of its
hormone drugs to be used to protect against aging skin, heart disease, and
dementia.76 Ghostwritten articles emphasizing the benefits of the two
hormones were published in medical journals from 1998 to 2005.77
However, in 2002, a federal study on hormone therapy demonstrated that
menopausal women taking certain hormones had an increased risk of
invasive breast cancer, heart disease, and stroke.78
Heads of these MECCs vow that the companies “will not participate
in the publication of any material in which it does not have complete
confidence in the scientific validity of the content, based upon the best
available data.”79 Nevertheless, this example shows explicitly how
medical research can take swift and dangerous turns, and further why
participating in the required FDA testing is so important to ensure public
safety.
Lurking within many of these ghostwritten articles is a Faustian
bargain. Pharmaceutical companies directly pay MECCs to draft articles
that include research—whether or not substantiated—supporting the
drug’s use for off-label purposes. In the worst-case scenario, the
academics that sign off on the draft as being scientifically accurate do not
even perform research or review the adequacy of findings. They are
merely selling their established credibility and putative integrity for
monetary gain. Thus, these articles are not only biased in favor of the
drug manufacturers, but their existence can undermine faith in actual
high-quality studies because, intrinsically, there is no transparency in
these arrangements.
When questioned about the credibility of their findings,
pharmaceutical companies will often deny their affiliated academics the

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Moffatt & Elliott, supra note 71, at 24.
Id. at 22.
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., supra note 70, at 2.
See Singer, supra note 69.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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opportunity to review raw data.80 This situation occurred with Proctor &
Gamble (P&G) and Aubrey Blumsohn, a senior lecturer in the Bone
Metabolism Unit at Sheffield University.81
In 2002, Blumsohn
contracted with P&G to perform research and speak on the company’s
behalf about new uses for drugs.82 However, when Blumsohn finally
became convinced that P&G had intentionally skewed their data to make
it look as if a drug was performing better than it really had, P&G refused
to share the raw data with him.83 This instance reveals that the researchdriven data that pharma gives to MECCs and academics might not only
be selectively cherry-picked, but could also be falsified.
The prevalence of ghostwriting exacerbates the problem. One study
published in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA)
concluded that ghostwriting was evident in 11 percent of published
articles appearing in six leading medical journals.84 More specifically, a
study solely focusing on medical literature devoted to the Pfizer’s drug,
Zoloft, found that, in three years, approximately 57 percent (55 of 96) of
all published articles on the drug in peer-reviewed medical journals were
written by a MECC that Pfizer hired to manage publications on Zoloft.85
Due to this lack of transparency, inherent conflict of interest,
problems with credibility and falsification, and its ubiquity, the practice
of ghostwriting is a fraud on journals, their readers, and patients. Pharma
has mastered the secrecy of the process and has repeatedly breached
respected medical journals’ safeguards to publish these ghostwritten
articles. Readers, very often doctors, are thus deceived into believing
flawed or falsified studies as credible basis for medical decision-making.
In turn, ghostwriting affects patients because doctors put these
unsubstantiated treatments into practice, which can be either unbeneficial
or possibly dangerous to the patient.
H.

Unethical and Aggressive Courting of Physicians

Ghostwritten articles are simply one component of an integrated
strategy to promote off-label usage. Pharma’s multi-pronged approach
includes the following tactics: (1) instructing sales representatives to
initiate discussions with doctors during sales calls regarding off-label
uses; (2) using medical liaisons working in conjunction with sales
representatives when the medical community believes the liaisons are

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

See Moffatt & Elliott, supra note 71, at 21.
See id.
See id. at 21-22.
See id. at 21.
See Moffatt & Elliott, supra note 71, at 22.
See id. at 22-23.
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individuals hired to provide scientific knowledge rather than sell a
manufacturer’s drug; (3) paying doctors to allow its sales representatives
to participate in discussions with patients regarding treatment options;
(4) paying doctors to travel to lavish locations to attend consultant or
advisory meetings that exclusively discuss off-label uses of the
company’s drugs; (5) hosting teleconferences where the company pays
doctors to instruct other doctors about newly discovered off-label uses;
and (6) hosting CME seminars that are intended to give the appearance
of providing independent medical education regarding off-label uses.86
These tactics represent potentially multiple AKS violations.
Further, although the WLF decisions decided that hosting CME seminars
are within a manufacturer’s rights, the above practices are clearly aimed
to increase the market for their drugs in an ethically questionable
manner. Given drug manufacturers’ aggressive tactics to expand the
market for their drugs without applying for supplemental FDA-approval,
it is obvious why the FDA and DOJ are adamant about investigating
these companies for illegally circumventing the system. As former
Associate Attorney General Robert McCallum highlighted, the stakes are
the following:
It is of paramount importance that the DOJ use every legal tool at its
disposal to assure the health and safety of the consumer of America’s
health care system, and to pursue companies and individuals that
steal from the taxpayers and inflict suffering on patients and
87
families.

I.

Gag Clauses and Data Transparency

Gag clauses are a means for pharmaceutical companies, as sponsors
of clinical research with a financial interest in the outcome, to suppress
negative test results. As Robert Steinbrook notes, gag clauses frequently
appear in clinical-trial agreements and serve to “prevent investigators
from examining the data independently” or from publishing the results
“without first obtaining the consent of the sponsor.”88 Negative results
are thus routinely underreported or unreported altogether.

86. See Craft, supra note 1, at 115-16 (referencing Sentencing Mem. of the United
States, United States v. Warner-Lambert Co., Criminal No. 04-10150 RGS (D. Mass.
2004)).
87. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Warner-Lambert to Pay $430 Million to
Resolve Criminal & Civil Health Care Liability Relating to Off-Label Promotion (May
13, 2004), available at http://1.usa.gov/NtwuuH.
88. Robert Steinbrook, Gag Clauses in Clinical-Trial Agreements, 352 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 2160, 2160 (2005).
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Pharma’s control over the clinical-trial process results in a lack of
transparency and, consequently, an unsafe environment for American
consumers. Pharma retains this control due to the monetary support they
provide academic institutions, unaffiliated medical centers, and private
contract research organizations (CROs). As a result, these research
bodies are forced to compete with each other over pharma-sponsored
clinical-trial agreements. One could argue that academic institutions
have reputational interests and institutional values that can countervail
this pressure to accept gag clauses. However, for-profit CROs do not
have these same constraints. In fact, over the last decade, CROs have
dramatically increased their share of the clinical research at the expense
of academic institutions because of their malleability to pharma’s
needs.89 Thus, this race to the bottom in the clinical testing marketplace
enables pharma to insist on gag clauses in research contracts.
Over a decade ago, the International Committee of Medical Journal
Editors (ICMJE) “began to require that the responsible author of a study
state in writing that he or she accepted full responsibility for the conduct
of the trial, had access to the data, and controlled the decision to
publish.”90 However, the ICMJE only represents a handful of medical
journals and is not in a position to establish industry-wide guidelines.
Such lack of influence is demonstrated by a Duke University study,
which revealed that academic institutions routinely engaged in industrysponsored research that failed to adhere to ICMJE guidelines.91
Although several researchers and regulatory bodies propose the need for
standard contract provisions for industry-sponsored research, such
provisions are frequently absent from clinical-trial agreements because of
the ongoing competition for research sponsorship.
The argument against gag clauses continues to gain traction since
the avoidable Vioxx fiasco and the trial-related disclosure of internal
emails of pharmaceutical giant Merck. These documents demonstrate
that Merck knew years before it pulled Vioxx off the shelves that the
drug had increased risks of heart disease and stroke as compared to its
industry competitors: aspirin and naproxen.92 Although Vioxx was not
89. Fazal Khan, The Human Factor: Globalizing Ethical Standards in Drug Trials
Through Market Exclusion, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 877, 894 (2007) (Observing that, “as the
size of the drug market dramatically expanded . . . pharmaceutical companies became
impatient with academic centers, and by the late 1990s the monetary flow from drug
companies to academic centers had greatly receded.”).
90. See Steinbrook, supra note 88, at 2160.
91. Id.
92. See Anna Wilde Mathews & Barbara Martinez, Warning Signs: E-Mails Suggest
Merck Knew Vioxx’s Dangers at Early Stage, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2004, at A1; Dani
Veracity, Leaked Documents Show Merck Knew of Vioxx Dangers, Yet Hid Them for
Years, NATURALNEWS.COM (Aug. 6, 2005), http://bit.ly/TxNoPN; E. Huff, Merck Sat on
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taken off the market until September 2004, reports indicate that Merck
knew of the life-threatening side effects as early as 1996.93 Merck
conducted tests during which they intentionally excluded participants
with an increased risk of heart disease because they did not want to risk
the chance of profuse negative results.94
The company’s research directors also explained the profound
negative side effects of Vioxx to Merck’s executive management. In
March 2000, Merck’s research chief, Edward Scolnick, wrote in an email
his belief that test results unmistakably affirmed that heart problems
associated with Vioxx were “clearly there” and that it was a “shame.”95
Merck’s indiscretions affecting public safety went even further, as they
consistently threatened and sued academic researchers who questioned
the safety of Vioxx during public lectures.96 These actions demonstrate
that not only is pharma willing to cease sponsoring academic institutions
who insist on publishing the truth, but companies are willing to risk the
health of the nation as they intentionally mislead American doctors and
patients about the safety of their products.
Progress against gag clauses may be forthcoming as concern mounts
about public safety, distrust of the pharmaceutical industry spreads, and
advocacy within the medical community for greater openness in
conducting and reporting clinical trials increases.97 Senators Chris Dodd
and Chuck Grassley confronted this challenge head on and attempted to
pass legislation including the Fair Access to Clinical Trials (FACT) Act
of 2007 and the Food and Drug Administration Safety Act of 2007
(FDASA).98
The FACT Act sought to amend the Public Health Service Act and
was premised on increased transparency of the entire industry and greater
accountability in health research and development.99 It sought to ensure
that both the scientific community and the public have access to basic

Data Showing Vioxx Risks for Years Before Pulling Drug, NATURALNEWS.COM (Jan. 15,
2010), http://bit.ly/4Qn4cJ.
93. Veracity, supra note 92.
94. Id. (uncovering one email from a Vice President stating that “the possibility of
increased [cardiovascular] events is of great concern . . . [and] I just can’t wait to be the
one to present those results to senior management!”).
95. Huff, supra note 92.
96. See Mathews & Martinez, supra note 92 (reporting conversations between
prominent Stanford researchers and a Merck chief executive, in which the executive
bluntly “suggested that if this continued, [the researcher] would ‘flame out’ and there
would be consequences for [the doctor] and for Stanford.”).
97. Steinbrook, supra note 88, at 2.
98. Press Release, Sen. Chuck Grassley, Sens. Grassley, Dodd Seek (Jan. 30, 2007),
available at http://1.usa.gov/VnqMx4 [hereinafter Bold Reforms for Drug Safety].
99. Id.
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information about clinical trials by expanding data that is already made
available at clinicaltrials.gov.100 The main objective of the FACT Act
was to operate a data bank of information on clinical trials, to include
(1) a clinical trials registry of health-related interventions conducted
to test the safety or effectiveness of any drug, biological product, or
device intended to treat serious or life-threatening diseases and
condition; and (2) a clinical trial results database of health-related
interventions to test the safety or effectiveness of any drug, biological
101
product, or device.

Whereas the FACT Act’s focus was primarily on public access to
the clinical trial process, FDASA sought to enhance the drug-safety
monitoring system. Its goal was to bring a new level of priority and
independence to the post-market surveillance of drugs by establishing an
independent center within the FDA responsible for monitoring the safety
of drugs once they are on the market.102 This center would have the
authority to take corrective action if a drug is a risk to patients.103 In
essence, the FACT Act would have armed the FDA with a greater ability
to regulate pharma and would have provided reliable assurance that the
drugs on the market are in fact safe for consumers.
Although these acts provided a means of superior regulation in both
pre- and post-market drug surveillance, neither act was passed into law.
Nonetheless, there are several constructive takeaways from the ideas of
Senators Dodd and Grassley. American consumers need structural
accountability from pharma-sponsored testing that consistently
underreports negative results, paints unsupportive results in a brighter
light, and publishes almost every positive test.104 Although there are
notable benefits to companies not going through the lengthy and costprohibitive constraints of the regulatory process, it is imperative for
consumer safety and fiscal responsibility (i.e., by prohibiting fraud
against the government) that research results are founded upon reliable
data.
The FACT Act and FDASA were dedicated to affording greater
transparency of clinical trials, providing greater accountability of
100. Id.
101. Summary of the Fair Access to Clinical Trials Act of 2007, GOVTRAC.US,
http://bit.ly/TSqJbA (last visited Oct. 23, 2012).
102. Bold Reforms for Drug Safety, supra note 98.
103. Id.
104. Marc-Andre Gagnon and Sergio Sismondo, Is Drug Research Turning Into a
Scam?, THE MARK (May 11, 2011), http://bit.ly/XREsn5 (reporting that pharma
systematically failed to publish negative studies on several antidepressants; of 74 trials,
38 positive and 36 negative, 94% of the positive tests were published, compared to only
23% of the negative tests).
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pharma, and offering objective, post-market surveillance of
pharmaceuticals. In the Obama administration’s recent FDA budget
request for 2013, it sought a significant increase in industry-paid user
fees. To reduce the effect of gag clauses on clinical-trial reporting, user
fees could sponsor an independent center to perform equivalent clinical
testing. This independent center, with no financial incentive to
promulgate unsubstantiated results or conceal negative tests, could be
relied on to bring forth the actual results of clinical trials. The
independent center would be responsible for publishing the trial results in
a database such as clinicaltrials.gov, thus inserting this information into
the public domain. If the pharma-sponsored clinical trials were in line
with the independent testing, then pharma could publish the results. This
alternative would ensure that the drug industry was not merely
publishing favorable results and skewing public knowledge.
Another alternative, which could supplement the suggestion above,
would be to create a user-fee-sponsored independent testing center that
conducts post-market testing on drugs deriving a significant portion of
their profit from off-label uses. As the struggle against ghostwriting
persists, off-label uses continue to gain prevalence, and pharma
continuously avoids accountability. Independent post-market testing of
drugs prominently prescribed for non-FDA approved off-label uses
would bring certainty and clarity to the efficacy of such off-label uses.
Doctors’ access to actual results would be greater, providing for surety
and safety in prescribing practices. The FDA approval process is timeconsuming and costly, and there is acknowledged benefits to bypassing
this process at times. However, such benefits should never outweigh
concerns for public safety. Although additional changes to the entire
process should be considered, the authors hope that these two ideas
provide at least a well-conceived starting point for greater discussion.
III. WHAT WE GAIN AND LOSE FROM OFF-LABEL REGULATIONS
The fight between proponents and opponents of off-label marketing
is endless, and combines a mixture of both theoretical and practical costs
and benefits. The primary benefit of off-label promotion is to keep the
health care community informed about scientific advances that will
benefit patients.105 This information will in turn improve the quality of
health care without waiting for the lengthy FDA approval process.106 On
the other hand, there is a strong temptation for manufacturers to promote
off-label use of their drugs purely for profit, without concern for public

105.
106.

Greene, supra note 54, at 47.
Id.
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health.107 Profit-driven off-label promotion can expose the public to
severe health risks and the drug manufacturer to legal liability.108
A.

Proponents’ Arguments in Support of Off-Label Promotion

As mentioned, the arguments for and against off-label marketing
range from the practical to the theoretical. Proponents argue that offlabel medicine is necessary to ensure that patients receive the most
effective treatment.109 Underlying this argument, proponents theorize
that drug companies are in the best position to provide doctors with
current medical research and treatments, given the vast amount of
medical literature and the lack of time doctors have to read it.110
Building on this idea is the fact that the FDA approval and review
process lags behind the availability of the most innovative approaches
and therapies, validating that pharmaceutical companies and their sales
reps are in the best position to make doctors aware of cutting-edge
technologies and practices.111 Provided that doctors are experts in this
field, proponents further argue that they are “best able to evaluate the
information and [i]nsure that patients receive appropriate treatment[s]”—
an argument supported by the American “learned intermediary” tort
doctrine.112
The strongest and most readily identified supporting argument for
off-label marketing is its cost-containment potential. Avoiding the
lengthy and extensive FDA approval process can decrease costs “both in
terms of controlling price increases and in saving tax dollars channeled
to FDA efforts.”113 By allowing off-label uses, drug companies should
experience increased sales volume allowing them to decrease sales
price.114 Allowing manufacturers to sell their products off-label will also
save them the time, money, and resources that they otherwise would
expend to become FDA approved.115
However, this cost-cutting theory holds little weight when the actual
numbers are analyzed. Between 1990 and 1999—the prime decade of
expansion for off-label marketing efforts—Medicaid spending on

107. Id. at 43.
108. Id.
109. Margaret Z. Johns, Informed Consent: Requiring Doctors to Disclose Off-Label
Prescriptions and Conflicts of Interest, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 967, 980 (2007).
110. Id. at 980-81.
111. Ascroft, supra note 30, at 99.
112. Johns, supra note 109, at 981.
113. Greene, supra note 54, at 48.
114. Johns, supra note 109, at 981.
115. Id.
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prescription drugs more than tripled from $4.8 billion to $17 billion.116
In fact, between 1990 and 2002, the total amount spent in the U.S. on
prescription drugs increased from $40.6 billion to $162 billion.117
During that same time, prescription drug prices increased 7.4 percent,
compared to inflation rising merely 2.5 percent.118 On that same note,
prices for the 200 top-selling drugs are currently rising three times faster
than the country’s inflation rate.119 As Margaret Johns highlights, “[T]he
price of Claritin, the top-selling allergy pill, was raised thirteen times
over five years, an increase of more than 50%—more than four times the
rate of inflation.”120 Given this data, projections estimate that national
spending on prescription drugs will increase an average of 10.7 percent
until 2013.121 Thus, although the argument that off-label promotion will
drive cost-cutting is theoretically tenable, the statistics indicate
otherwise.
Authors Mackey and Liang present a novel approach to the
regulation of off-label medicine based on relaxed regulatory standards
for drugs intended for vulnerable patient and orphan disease patient
populations.122 As discussed in Part IV infra, there are merits to this
proposal when considering the costs of regulatory approval—even under
the Orphan Drug Act of 1983—and the expected financial incentives.
These authors argue that, since the vulnerable patient and orphan disease
patient populations have relatively few, if any, options for recovery by
FDA approved drugs and are already at risk of death, the FDA’s
regulatory protections based on ensuring safety and efficacy are not as
relevant.123 However, the D.C. Circuit ruled that vulnerable patient
populations, like healthy populations, have no fundamental right of
access to experimental drugs that have not gone through the FDA
approval process.124 Citing the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v.
Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 555-56 (1979), the court in Abigail Alliance
noted “that ‘[f]or the terminally ill, as for anyone else, a drug is unsafe if
its potential for inflicting death or physical injury is not offset by the
possibility of therapeutic benefit.’”125 In the court’s view, because a drug
cannot be proven either safe or effective for a certain use without going
116. Greene, supra note 54, at 43.
117. Johns, supra note 109, at 972.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 973.
120. Id. at 982.
121. Johns, supra note 109, at 972.
122. See generally Mackey & Liang, supra note 65.
123. See id.
124. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Devl. Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495
F.3d 695, 714 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
125. Id. at 713.
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through all phases of FDA approval, its potential for inflicting death or
injury is not offset by the possibility of therapeutic benefit. Therefore,
unapproved drugs are categorically deemed unsafe.
The authors’ proposal, however, can be distinguished from the
plaintiffs in Abigail Alliance because it focuses on off-label uses of drugs
that have already been approved, not drugs that have yet to receive any
FDA approval. Yet, one can read from the main holding in Abigail
Alliance an argument against relaxing prohibitions on off-label
marketing in the absence of proven therapeutic benefits for off-label
uses.126
B.

Opponents’ Arguments against Off-Label Promotion

The
aforementioned
benefits
and
overarching
(albeit
unsubstantiated) financial cost argument must also be “balanced with the
FDA’s underlying mission to ensure the safety and efficacy of
products.”127 The major concern stems from the possibility that
manufacturers who are purely concerned with their bottom-line—
whether trying to maximize profits before patents expire or searching to
expand the market for an approved drug—will “seek to market a product
for a new use by bypassing the formal FDA approval process and its
costs.”128 If off-label promotion is allowed, opponents argue that drug
companies will have no incentive to conduct the rigorous testing the
FDA requires and will completely avoid responsibility for establishing
that a drug is safe and effective for the off-label use they are
promoting.129
Opponents corroborate this argument with several
examples of off-label drug uses gone horribly wrong (notably, Vioxx,
Fen-phen, and Neurontin), to demonstrate that drug company research
conducted outside of the FDA oversight process is suspect given the
inherent conflicts of interest.130 Opponents further posit that, because of
the onslaught of ghostwritten academic articles in distribution, “the
doctor’s role as a learned intermediary has been severely
compromised.”131

126. As will be discussed in Part IV.C.2 infra, “Track Two” of our proposal addresses
a common issue raised by Mackey and Liang’s proposal. However, a major difference is
that the lever for regulatory change in our proposal is the existence of compelling and
trustworthy efficacy data produced by PCORI, not the presence of a vulnerable patient
population.
127. Greene, supra note 54, at 48.
128. Id.
129. Johns, supra note 109, at 981.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 981-82.

2012]

C.

VERIFY, THEN TRUST

429

Why Pharmaceutical Companies Continue to Promote Off-Label

It is understandable why pharma plays the double-game of denying
that they illegally promote particular off-label usages while asserting in
general that off-label usage is good for the public. Off-label marketing
affords drug manufacturers increased market growth and obvious costcutting and profit-increasing possibilities from circumventing the FDA
approval process. In contrast, “Rigorous clinical trials of new uses of
previously approved products are not only costly, but can also be
extremely risky for a firm that has a lucrative product on the market.”132
Obtaining FDA approval for a drug is a monetarily exhausting and
time-consuming process. The “approval process takes six to fifteen
years and costs between $100 million and $880 million per drug.”133 The
approval process demands the successful navigation of three increasingly
larger sets of human clinical trials, known as Phases I through III. 134
Following the conclusion of Phase III, the manufacturer must submit a
NDA to the FDA, which is supposed to report on all phases of testing.135
After all three phases of research is complete and the FDA approves
the NDA, the manufacturer may, on its own volition, conduct additional
Phase IV research.136 Phase IV research may or may not be subject to
the same restrictions and informed consent requirements that
manufacturers face during Phase I-III research, depending on the purpose
underlying the Phase IV research.137 Most drug companies that choose to
conduct Phase IV research opt to study side effects that possibly went
undetected in the initial trials, which is the route that does not face
stringent FDA restrictions.138
A study on the effects of hormone replacement therapy (HRT) on
the risk of heart disease in post-menopausal women is a prime example
of the risk that rigorous clinical trials pose to a drug manufacturer that is

132. Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 718-19, 732 (using the drug Vioxx to explain that,
“[f]rom the perspective of a firm that has a lucrative pharmaceutical product on the
market, rigorous clinical trials of new indications present a risk of generating results that
could destroy the value of the product rather than enhance it”).
133. Johns, supra note 109, at 973-74.
134. Id. at 988.
135. Id. at 974.
136. Id. at 988.
137. Johns, supra note 109, at 988.
138. Id. at 989 (describing further how research under this heading is not unusually
swindled into becoming a marketing effort of the drug to doctors, where manufacturers
pay doctors to enroll patients into drug trials that are not randomized nor weighed against
a comparison group, making it nearly impossible to draw any reliable conclusions).
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already enjoying substantial off-label sales.139
HRT, previously
approved for relief of menopausal symptoms, was at the time also being
prescribed regularly to lower the risk of heart disease for these women.140
Although HRT manufacturers were formally banned from promoting
HRT for this off-label purpose, they were reaping the benefits of
significantly increased sales from prescriptions in reliance on the results
of prior observational studies (which ultimately ended up being
discredited).141 Thus, HRT manufacturers had little economic reason to
subject the use of HRTs to more rigorous testing.
HRT manufacturers’ windfall profits abruptly ended when the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) conducted a long-term, controlled
study with over 16,000 patients.142 The NIH results “indicated an
increased risk of heart disease (as well as increased risks of other
diseases) in women receiving HRT.”143 Not surprisingly, this study
decimated sales of the hormone treatment.144 Industry’s prior position
that this study was unnecessary is indefensible as, “[i]n this case,
government funding provided valuable and credible information that the
product’s manufacturer had little incentive to uncover on its own[,]” and
the information resulting from it is of undeniable value to patients,
physicians, health insurers, and policy makers.145
IV. MITIGATING THE HARMS AND REAPING THE BENEFITS: ALLOWING
A SAFE HARBOR TO PROMOTE OFF-LABEL RESEARCH CONDUCTED
UNDER THE PATIENT-CENTERED OUTCOMES RESEARCH INSTITUTE
As discussed above, current off-label marketing restrictions are
subject to several powerful criticisms: (1) they restrict flow of
information that could help both doctors and patients; (2) the rules are
inefficient and lead to companies willfully breaching the law; and
(3) such rules may violate the First Amendment rights of pharmaceutical
companies.
All of the above critiques have persuasive force only if we have
confidence that industry communications regarding specific off-label
usages are indeed accurate. However, as previously mentioned, there is
ample evidence that pharma has corrupted the practice of off-label

139. Id. at 989; see also J.E. Rossouw et al., Risks and Benefits of Estrogen Plus
Progestin in Healthy Postmenopausal Women: Principal Results from the Women’s
Health Initiative Randomized Controlled Trial, 288 JAMA 321 (2002).
140. Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 732.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 732.
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prescribing. Its contemporary form is far removed from its origins as a
way of preserving physician autonomy in practicing the “art of
medicine” and allowing for innovation. Instead, it has become a
backdoor for pharma to generate substantial profits on patented drugs by
creating new markets without proving to the public that such uses are
safe and effective. Further, there is ample evidence that many of the offlabel studies sponsored by pharma are not trustworthy and are the fruit of
questionable practices such as gag clauses, cherry-picked data, and
ghostwriting. Consequently, patients and third party payors likely incur
harms because medically unproven therapies raise issues of both patient
safety and unnecessary healthcare expenses.
This begs the question of what would happen if the off-label
research being disseminated by drug companies was actually reliable and
produced by independent researchers using sound methodology? Should
evidence of these research characteristics significantly change FDA rules
on restricting off-label marketing? In this section, we argue in the
affirmative: that is, in the presence of research criteria that can be
validated as trustworthy, the FDA should allow for wider and less
restricted dissemination of off-label study findings.
This section proposes (1) to amend the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (PPACA) and the role of the Patient Centered
Outcomes Research Institute (PCORI) to increase the amount of
trustworthy comparative effectiveness research (CER) on off-label drug
uses, and (2) to amend FDA regulations to create a “safe harbor” for offlabel marketing of CER studies generated through this process. The
rationale behind this proposal is that promoting off-label uses to
physicians is not intrinsically harmful and, in fact, could be beneficial if
there is some way to ensure the validity of the disseminated speech.
Recognizing that the incentives for conducting CER on off-label uses can
vary greatly depending on particular circumstances, the proposal sets
forth two different research tracks: one track to be initiated and funded
by PCORI; and a second track to be initiated and funded by
pharmaceutical companies, but that is overseen by PCORI.
A.

What is Comparative Effectiveness Research?

Using evidence based medicine (EBM) and comparative
effectiveness research (CER) to guide treatment decisions is not a novel
concept. In the 1970s, for example, the founder of the Dartmouth Atlas
Project, Dr. Jack Wennberg, analyzed Medicare utilization data and
uncovered dramatic geographic variation in the utilization of healthcare
resources. Wennberg identified an epidemic of hysterectomies in some
areas of Maine, where the data predicted that 70 percent of the women in
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one town would receive this procedure sometime during their lifetime.146
Medical need was not driving this epidemic, but rather local medical
practice and fee-for-service economic incentives.
In the 1980s, the predecessor of the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS), the Health Care Financing Administration
(HCFA), “launched an aggressive program of research on outcomes of
care that would serve as the basis of medical practice guidelines and even
coverage policy for federal health insurance programs.”147 However,
HCFA and CMS have always faced political pushback from
manufacturers of costly medical devices and other health care
stakeholders who were rightly concerned that robust CER data could
undermine profits stemming from expensive care with little or no
demonstrable benefits.
In 1999, the Health Care Research and Quality Act established the
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) to generate a
“broad base of scientific research” to assess the effectiveness and
appropriateness of health care services and improve outcomes.148 As
before, political considerations moved Congress to specify that the
AHRQ could not “mandate national standards of clinical practice”;149 in
other words, its recommendations could not directly guide coverage
decisions.
More recently, in an influential article published in The New Yorker,
medical author Atul Gawande used Dartmouth Atlas data to highlight
“why two border towns in Texas of similar size, location, and
circumstances—McAllen and El Paso—should cost Medicare such
enormously different amounts of money.”150 Costs in McAllen were
twice as much as in El Paso due to physicians ordering “vastly more
diagnostic tests, hospital admissions, operations, specialist visits, and
home nursing care.”151 Further, Gawande concluded that the quality of
care in McAllen “is not appreciably better, and by some measures, it is
worse.”152 In other words, without credible evidence of safety and
efficacy, more healthcare—whether in the form of off-label prescriptions
or diagnostic tests—can be costly and dangerous.
146. Alix Spiegel, The Telltale Wombs of Lewiston, Maine, NPR (Oct. 9, 2008),
http://n.pr/6FPAm.
147. Eleanor D. Kinney, Comparative Effectiveness Research Under the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act: Can New Bottles Accommodate Old Wine?, 37 AM.
J. L. & MED. 522, 527 (2011).
148. Id. at 531.
149. Id.
150. Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum Redux, THE NEW YORKER (June 23, 2009),
http://nyr.kr/LPFBH.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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In 2009, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA)
directed the Institute of Medicine (IOM) to develop a report that defined
CER and its importance in setting research priorities:153
CER is the generation and synthesis of evidence that compares the
benefits and harms of alternative methods to prevent, diagnose, treat,
and monitor a clinical condition or to improve the delivery of care.
The purpose of CER is to assist consumers, clinicians, purchasers,
and policy makers to make informed decisions that will improve
154
health care at both the individual and population levels.

Notably, ARRA set aside $1.1 billion to fund CER through several
federal agencies: the AHRQ, the NIH, and the Office of the Secretary of
the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS).155 All of these
efforts informed the creation of PCORI, which has the potential to
incorporate more broadly CER and evidence based medicine (EBM) into
the structure of healthcare in the U.S. and bring it more in line with the
healthcare systems of other developed nations.
B.

What is the Patient Centered Outcomes Research Institute?

As stated on its website: “PCORI was established by Congress
through the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act but is by
law an independent, non-profit organization.”156 A 21-member board
governs PCORI, and it actively seeks “input from a broad range of
stakeholders to guide its work.” In January 2012, PCORI released its
“Draft National Priorities for Research and Research Agenda” and
opened it up to comments from the public.157 PPACA defines the role of
PCORI as the following:
The purpose of the Institute is to assist patients, clinicians,
purchasers, and policy-makers in making informed health decisions
by advancing the quality and relevance of evidence concerning the
manner in which diseases, disorders, and other health conditions can
effectively and appropriately be prevented, diagnosed, treated,

153. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 804,
123 Stat. 115, 187-88 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 299b-8 (2006 & Supp. 2010)).
154. COMM. ON COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH PRIORITIZATION, INST. OF
MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., INITIAL NATIONAL PRIORITIES FOR COMPARATIVE
EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH 13 (2009).
155. Comparative Effectiveness Research Funding, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., http://1.usa.gov/y1UCU (last visited Oct. 23, 2012).
156. About Us, PCORI, http://bit.ly/piYn0m (last visited Oct. 23, 2012).
157. PATIENT-CENTERED OUTCOMES RESEARCH INST., DRAFT NATIONAL PRIORITIES
FOR RESEARCH AND RESEARCH AGENDA VERSION 1 (2012), available at
http://bit.ly/ygf16e [hereinafter DRAFT NAT’L PRIORITIES].
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monitored, and managed through research and evidence synthesis
that considers variations in patient subpopulations, and the
dissemination of research findings with respect to the relative health
outcomes, clinical effectiveness, and appropriateness of the medical
158
treatments, services. . . .

To address concerns from pharma and medical device manufacturers
(and affiliated politicians) that CER might be used to “ration” healthcare
or, more hyperbolically, to establish “death panels,” PPACA expressly
limits PCORI findings from being used “to mandate coverage,
reimbursement, or other policies for any public or private payer.”159
Nevertheless, nothing in PPACA prevents Medicare or private payors
from being influenced by PCORI findings in determining what is
“medically necessary” and hence subject to coverage.
PPACA created the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Trust
Fund (PCORTF) to generate funding and provide oversight of PCORI
spending.160 PCORTF is funded by a transfer of funds from Medicare
Part A and B and fees levied on private insurers and self-insured
employer health plans.161 Given that funding studies on certain drugs
could be seen as picking winners and losers, PCORI did not identify
specific research projects but instead five general areas of research it
considers as top priorities: preventative care, healthcare systems,
communication and dissemination, healthcare disparities, and research
methodologies.162 Going forward, these broad categories will likely be
fleshed out with more detailed descriptions of specific research projects,
“taking into account factors of disease incidence, prevalence, and burden
in the U.S. (with emphasis on chronic conditions)” and “gaps in evidence
in terms of clinical outcomes.”163
Is there reason to trust the legitimacy of PCORI findings more than
studies currently being conducted under the direction of industry?
PCORI states that research commissioned by it “will produce
information patients and their health care providers can trust.”164 PCORI

158. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010).
159. Id. § 6301, 124 Stat. 119; see also Angie D. Holan, Palin “Death Panel” Claim
Sets Truth-O-Meter Ablaze, POLITIFACT (Aug. 10, 2009, 6:58 PM), http://bit.ly/y5Sm0
(“‘As more Americans delve into the disturbing details of the nationalized health care
plan that the current administration is rushing through Congress, our collective jaw is
dropping, and we’re saying not just no, but hell no!’ wrote Palin in a note posted Aug. 7,
2009.”).
160. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1320e(b)(3).
161. Id.
162. DRAFT NAT’L PRIORITIES, supra note 157.
163. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1320e(d)(1).
164. DRAFT NAT’L PRIORITIES, supra note 157.
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can credibly make this claim because the statutory language that created
it has robust requirements for ensuring (1) transparency of research
results, (2) conflict of interest disclosures, and (3) best practices in
research methodologies. For instance, all PCORI research data will be
publicly available, negating legitimacy issues tied to industry practices of
gag clauses, manipulating or suppressing data. Conflict of interest rules
can prevent issues associated with “ghostwriting” or researchers being
financially dependent on funding from pharmaceutical companies, which
might influence their findings if they want follow-up research contracts.
Methodological oversight is important as “[m]any medical professionals
maintain that findings from current clinical trials used to test the safety
and efficacy of pharmaceutical products and medical devices do not
reflect the conditions of medical practice and thus their findings are less
relevant to medical practitioners.”165
C.

Where Does Off-Label Research Fit Within PCORI’s Mission?

Given the prevalence of off-label usage for many chronic conditions
and the gaps in knowledge regarding the safety and effectiveness of these
uses, it seems that a broad class of off-label research fits within PCORI’s
mission. As described above, in general the pharmaceutical and medical
device industries are extremely wary of CER because it can conclusively
demonstrate that many expensive and profitable products are no more
effective than less costly alternatives. In this situation, there is a strong
public interest in PCORI conducting CER on these off-label uses,
especially since pharmaceutical companies have a strong financial
incentive in avoiding such comparisons if they cannot control the data or
are uncertain that the research will be in their favor. However, there
might be some instances where a drug company might want research
validation of a promising off-label use, but the potential market is too
small (i.e., an “orphan disease”) to justify a full-blown sNDA.
Additionally, since insurers often reject coverage of such off-label use on
grounds that it is “experimental,” validation by PCORI testing could
open the door for third-party reimbursement. Would PCORI research on
this off-label use fit its mission? It does not seem to fit the priorities set
by PPACA in creating this institute. Further, there is an argument that
prioritizing such research would not be the most efficient or equitable
use of PCORTF funds. Considering the above analysis, our proposal sets
forth two different off-label research tracks for PCORI. Track One is to
be initiated by PCORI for “public interest” considerations, and Track

165. Eleanor Kinney, Prospects For Comparative Effectiveness Research Under
Federal Health Reform, 21 ANN. HEALTH L. 79, 86 (2012).
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Two is to be initiated by pharmaceutical companies seeking validation of
off-label uses for their drugs.
1.

Track One

If a drug reaches a certain threshold of off-label usage (by either
monetary value or percentage of total prescriptions of drug), PCORI
should initiate drug testing in this case because drug companies have
little incentive to do further testing in this instance and eliminate “gaps in
evidence.” For instance, drugs such as Neurontin and Zyprexa would fit
this category.166 For a company that already has a lucrative off-label
market presence for its drug, further testing carries significant risk
because additional testing could reveal that the drug is not safe or
effective in this additional off-label use.
The funding for these studies can come from the PCORTF, the
traditional funding source for PCORI. There is an equitable rationale for
funding this type of research from this pool: these payors can benefit
financially from eliminating unnecessary costs for unproven treatments
that have a high level of prevalence in the marketplace. Further, such an
effort dovetails with PPACA’s promotion of Accountable Care
Organizations, entities structured to benefit from improved patient
outcomes and not necessarily from the increased utilization of
healthcare.167
2.

Track Two

An “orphan disease” is a relatively rare medical condition that the
pharmaceutical industry has little financial incentive to pursue because
the cost of full regulatory approval and marketing is not economically
justified by the size of the market. For example, in the case of rare
cancers, existing drugs might be effectively used in an off-label manner,
but pharmaceutical companies might be wary of promoting these uses
because the financial payoff might not outweigh the regulatory risk.
166. See Evans, supra note 23.
167. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) defines Accountable
Care Organizations as
groups of doctors, hospitals, and other health care providers, who come
together voluntarily to give coordinated high quality care to their Medicare
patients. The goal of coordinated care is to ensure that patients, especially the
chronically ill, get the right care at the right time, while avoiding unnecessary
duplication of services and preventing medical errors. When an ACO succeeds
both in both delivering high-quality care and spending health care dollars more
wisely, it will share in the savings it achieves for the Medicare program.
Accountable Care Organizations, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Apr. 5,
2012, 10:20 AM), http://go.cms.gov/J6vURy.
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Additionally, insurance companies might reject coverage of such uses as
“experimental.”
The incentives in this track are reversed from the case described
above in “Track One,” as a pharmaceutical company would likely want
additional studies performed on these off-label uses if they could more
assertively communicate (i.e., market) such information to doctors.
Therefore, this article proposes a second track of research, “Track Two,”
which would allow pharmaceutical companies to directly petition PCORI
to conduct studies on the safety and effectiveness of off-label usages for
orphan diseases. In contrast with “Track One,” funding for these studies
would not come from PCORTF, but user fees paid by the pharmaceutical
companies. This method would parallel the model already set up by the
FDA for clinical drug trials under the Prescription Drug User Fee Act
(PDUFA).168 However, opening up access to PCORI’s research agenda
by itself is likely not enough incentive for pharmaceutical companies to
incur such research expenses. However, as described below, if the FDA
rules on marketing off-label findings to physicians were relaxed for
studies generated through PCORI, this could nudge pharmaceutical
companies to fund such testing. In this scenario, the drug companies
face little risk from such testing because they do not currently have a
large market for such off-label usages, but their reward in the form of
relaxed marketing rules to doctors could provide enough incentive. Once
again, the benefit of conducting such research under the auspices of
PCORI is readily apparent because it would have to follow rules
regarding transparency, conflict of interest, and proper methodology.
D.

Research Capacity

The question remains whether this proposal is feasible given the
relatively small footprint of PCORI. If this proposal were implemented,
it would certainly increase the administrative burden of PCORI.
However, PPACA anticipates and allows for outsourcing of PCORI
research outside of the government (e.g., NIH, NSF, and DHHS) to
academic and private research institutions.169 Thus, this proposal is
feasible to the extent that it would not rely solely on extending the
federal government’s research capacity. The additional oversight burden
of regulating the outsourced research for “Track Two” studies would
require more administrative resources, but, as described above, user fees
levied on pharmaceutical sponsors could shoulder this burden.

168. Prescription Drug User Fee Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2006).
169. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§ 1320e(d)(2)(B).
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Amending FDA Rules on Off-Label Marketing and Dissemination of
Research Findings

If the research process dictated by PCORI cures the legitimacy
problems currently facing off-label studies, then it seems from a practical
and First Amendment perspective that the FDA should create a “safe
harbor” for drug companies more liberally promoting such CER studies
to doctors. However, such safe harbor rules should not allow direct-toconsumer (DTC) marketing because that would undermine any incentive
drug companies would have to undergo more rigorous sNDA testing.
Indeed, if a drug company receives positive study results from either
Track One or Track Two, these results could provide it with more
incentive to apply for a sNDA in order to open up the possibility of DTC
marketing.
F.

First Amendment and Commercial Speech

In either continuing or amending its regulatory ban on off-label
marketing, the FDA has to consider that it is regulating commercial
speech that is protected by the First Amendment. Further, as discussed
below, the Supreme Court has recently expanded the scope of First
Amendment protection afforded to corporations. This substantial change
makes existing FDA restrictions on off-label marketing vulnerable to
legal attack by pharma.
For the last three decades, the four-part test in Central Hudson Gas
& Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission of New York has
guided courts on how to determine whether a restriction on commercial
speech was viable.170 The general principle from the test is that truthful
commercial speech is entitled to First Amendment protection. If the
government attempts to restrict such speech, it needs a substantial
governmental interest and must directly advance this interest in a
narrowly tailored fashion. The government body must prove that “the
harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them
to a material degree.”171 Lastly, the government need not use the least
restrictive means; however, there must be a “reasonable fit between the
legislature’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends . . . a
means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.”172 Essentially,
Central Hudson held that commercial speech regulations should be
reviewed with an intermediate level of scrutiny, reflecting the inherent
170. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980).
171. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001).
172. Id. at 556.
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differences between commercial and political speech within the First
Amendment and the government’s broader power to regulate commerce.
While Central Hudson has not been overruled, with two recent cases,
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission173 and Sorrell v. IMS
Health Inc.,174 it appears that the Court is fundamentally rethinking the
lower level of protection afforded to commercial speech under Central
Hudson.
In the much discussed 2010 ruling in Citizens United, the Court
expressed disapproval for what it characterized as speaker-based
discrimination in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
(BCRA).175 The Court ruled that BCRA’s two-tiered approach of
restricting corporate and union speech, while allowing individual speech,
unconstitutionally discriminated on the basis of “corporate identity.”176
In applying strict scrutiny to strike down central components of the law,
the Court explained that the government violated the First Amendment
because “certain disfavored associations of citizens—those that have
taken on the corporate form—are penalized for engaging in the same
political speech” as other entities (individuals and unincorporated
associations).177
In Sorrell, which was decided in 2011, the Vermont legislature
passed a regulation that prohibited pharmacies and other regulated
entities from selling or disseminating prescriber-identifying information
for marketing.178 Vermont argued that it was merely a commercial
restriction with an incidental burden on protected expression, necessary
to protect medical privacy, including physician confidentiality,
avoidance of harassment, and the integrity of the doctor-patient
relationship.179 The Court held the regulation to be more than an
incidental burden; and, in so determining, the Court decided that the
statute was not sufficiently narrow or proportional to the asserted interest
protected.180
Sorrell did not overrule Central Hudson, but the majority opinion
by Justice Kennedy, who also authored Citizens United, strongly
suggested that corporate commercial speech might be deserving of the
same protection as corporate political speech: “A consumer’s concern for
free flow of commercial speech may often be keener than this concern

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 900.
Id. at 900.
Id. at 908.
Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2659-60.
Id. at 2659, 2661.
Id. at 2668-69.
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for urgent political dialogue.”181 Justice Kennedy further analogized
Vermont’s statute to one that restricted political discourse, “but the State
may not burden protected expression in order to tilt public debate in a
preferred direction.”182
Thus, the Supreme Court held that speech in aid of pharmaceutical
marketing is a form of expression protected by the free speech clause of
the First Amendment.183 Furthermore, the Court opened the door for
drug manufacturers to make the credible legal argument that they have a
First Amendment right to market off-label uses and that the State has a
high burden to justify its content-based law as consistent with the First
Amendment.184 Sorrell requires the State’s interests to be proportional to
the resulting burdens placed on speech and inhibits the law from seeking
to suppress a disfavored message.185
The proposal set forth in this article seems to pass the heightened
level of scrutiny in Sorrell. Here, the government can argue that it has a
substantial interest in regulating such speech because the FDA can
empirically demonstrate that drug companies have abused the off-label
usage research process and have disseminated information that has been
misleading and harmful to both patients and third-party payors (e.g.,
Medicare, Medicaid, and private insurers). The proposal will openly
regulate speech (as opposed to commercial activity) and will need to
survive the heightened scrutiny standard discussed in Sorrell. Further, it
is important that imposed restrictions advance this interest in a narrowly
tailored fashion. To the extent that the proposal would lessen concerns
about the legitimacy of off-label research because of PCORI oversight,
this should consequently lessen the weight of the government’s interest
in restricting such speech.
Therefore, the creation of the “safe harbors” (allowing pharma to
disseminate more freely the results of PCORI testing to doctors on the

181. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2664 (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350,
364 (1977)).
182. Id. at 2671.
183. Id. at 2659.
184. Id. at 2667. Note that this is a different standard than Abigail Alliance. See
Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Devl. Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695
(D.C. Cir. 2007). In Abigail Alliance, the D.C. Circuit held that no person has a
fundamental right of access to experimental drugs. Id. at 705-07. The First Amendment,
alternatively, declares that manufacturers have a fundamental right of protected
expression guaranteed by the free speech clause. Thus, in Abigail Alliance, the court
applied the rational basis test, and it was the petitioner’s burden to prove that the
government’s restriction did not bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest;
whereas, under the strict or heightened scrutiny test here, it is the State’s burden to justify
its law as consistent with the First Amendment. Id.
185. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2668 (2011).
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benefits of off-label usage) is not only justified based on public policy
initiatives, one could also argue that they might be essential from a First
Amendment perspective to ensure that factually true speech is not being
suppressed.
Indeed, the potential impact of using Sorrell and Citizens United to
attack FDA restrictions on off-label marketing has not escaped the
attention of drug makers. Consequently, going forward, all restrictions
on pharmaceutical marketing (a protected expression under the First
Amendment’s free speech clause) must directly advance a substantial
government interest in a narrowly tailored fashion.
V.

CONCLUSION

The world of prescription drugs is plagued with a crisis of
legitimacy. Although many functional problems exist with the current
U.S. system of regulating off-label medicine, it all starts with the
pharmaceutical companies themselves.
Until these companies
understand that it is their responsibility to act with the utmost candor and
integrity in their relationships with physicians and patients, they will
continue to circumvent the FDA approval process and take advantage of
the system.
In the United Kingdom (U.K.), a system is in place that is
substantially regulated by non-government entities and the drug
manufacturers themselves.186 Statutory authority that is very comparable
to what exists in the U.S. is supplemented with a detailed code of
practice that helps to remove ambiguity in the law.187 Pharmaceutical
companies have a high level of engagement with the entire process
because they developed and adopted the code that exists in the U.K.188
These companies regularly examine their business practices, limit the
extent of their hospitality to MECCs and medical practitioners, and
exercise influence over other drug manufacturers.189
Moreover,
competitors, former employees, physicians, and patients can bring
complaints against drug manufacturers for violating the rules and
regulations against off-label promotion.190 As a result, the U.K. has in
place a transparent system that resolves conflicts expeditiously.191
Such a system is likely not feasible in the U.S. given that one
central government body serves as the gatekeeper and that the FDA and

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

See Osborn, supra note 21, at 340-52.
Id. at 340.
Id. at 341.
Id. at 347.
Id. at 345.
See Osborn, supra note 21, at 342.
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pharmaceutical companies have never worked in unison to eliminate
unethical interactions between manufacturers and physicians.
Nevertheless, there are still valuable takeaways from the U.K. system.
The U.S. system is in dire need of clarity. Clarity would make it easier
for enforcing bodies to prosecute misbehaving drug companies, and the
defined limitations would allow courts to make straightforward,
transparent determinations. By fair application of unambiguous rules,
and by promoting drug manufacturer awareness of the problems resulting
from off-label marketing, not only would the amount of federal tax
dollars spent on off-label drugs be decreased, the incidence rate of health
concerns stemming from improper off-label prescriptions will assuredly
be reduced.

